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FOREWORD: OF CHICKENS AND EGGS-
THE COMPATIBILITY OF MORAL 
RIGHTS AND CONSEQUENTIALIST 
ANALYSES 
RANDY E. BARNE'IT* 
CHICKENS AND EGGS 
Philosophers are accustomed to thinking of moral rights and 
consequentialist analyses as fundamentally incompatible. They 
frequently debate cases-both hypothetical and real-in which 
rights and consequences are in conflict. 1 For example, suppose 
an innocent child knows the whereabouts of a terrorist who has 
planted a nuclear bomb in a city. Would it be permissible to 
violate the child's moral right to be free from torture, if this was 
the only way to save millions of innocent lives? If this is permis-
sible, then do not moral rights yield to concerns about conse-
quences? Or suppose that a community incorrectly believes 
that an innocent person is guilty of a heinous crime. If the ben-
eficial consequences exceed the harmful consequences, would 
it be permissible to punish or even kill this innocent person? If 
not, then do not consequential concerns yield to moral rights? 
Three approaches are commonly taken to handle the poten-
tial conflict between rights and consequences. Some, perhaps 
most legal academics, purport to "balance" these competing 
concerns in an unspecified manner. Others, perhaps most phi-
losophers and economists, choose either moral rights or conse-
quentialism as their exclusive mode of normative analysis. Still 
others allow the value of both modes of analysis, but they re-
solve potential conflicts by giving one mode of analysis priority 
within some hierarchical scheme. 
The idea of avoiding conflicts between competing methods 
of evaluation by establishing the priority of one method is 
analogous to modern jurisprudential views of legal systems as 
purely hierarchical or, to use Lon Fuller's word, vertical.2 This 
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1. Ste Lomasky, Rights Without Stilts, 12 HARv.J.L. &: PuB. PoL'Y 775, 777-81 (1989). 
2. Set L. FULLER, THE MoRALITY OF LAw 233 (rev ed. 1969) (distinguishing between 
horizontal and vertical forms of order). 
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contrasts with an older view that acknowledged both the legiti-
macy and importance of many rival legal systems coexisting 
within a single legal order.8 Professor Fuller suggested that the 
conception of law as a hierarchical command is so appealing 
because it "expresses a concern with the problem of resolving 
conflicts within the legal system."4 In all but international af-
fairs (and even sometimes not there), it is difficult for many to 
understand or accept the possibility of the equal coexistence of 
decisionmakers within an over-all order that is ultimately 
nonhierarchical or, to use Lon Fuller's term, horizontal.5 
The prevailing belief that conflicts, whether between com-
peting legal systems or between competing modes of norma-
tive analysis, can be resolved only by establishing and then 
appealing to a "higher" authority accounts, I suspect, for the 
prevailing impetus to pose the question "Which mode of analy-
sis comes first, moral rights or consequences?" Cast in these 
terms the problem appears to be both intractable6 and reminis-
cent of the paradox "Which comes first, the chicken or the 
egg?" Viewed hierarchically, the chicken-egg problem-involv-
ing real chickens and their eggs-is also intractable. Neither 
can come first because, paradoxically, both need to come first. 
In this Foreword, I will explore the possibility that it is useful 
to analyze problems pertaining to law from both a moral rights 
and a consequentialist perspective; that each of these compet-
ing modes of analysis complements the other, notwithstanding 
the fact that one mode will sometimes conflict with the other; 
that the mode of analysis associated with traditional "natural 
rights" theories contains both a moral rights and a consequen-
tialist component; and that, just as both chickens and eggs are 
vital components of a process of biological evolution, moral 
rights and consequentialist analyses are vital components of a 
process of legal evolution-a process that includes both ele-
ments of change and elements of stability.7 
3. See H. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION 10 (1983) ("Perhaps the most distinctive 
characteristic of the Western legal tradition is the coexistence and competition within 
the same community of diverse jurisdictions and diverse legal systems."): L. FULLER, 
supra note 2, at 123 ("(M]ultiple [legal] systems [governing the same population] do 
exist and have in history been more common than unitary systems."). 
4. L FuLLER, supra note 2, at 111. 
5. See id. at 233. 
6. See Alexander, Comment: &rsonal Projects and Impersonal Rights, 12 HARv.j.L & PuB. 
PoL'Y 813, 825 (1989) ("All of these philosophical debates have proven intractable 
•.• ").See gmerally Fletcher, Par~ in Legal Thought, 85 CoLUM. L REV. 1263 (1985). 
7. The existence of constant change does not preclude the existence of comparative 
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DEFINING TERMS 
Let me begin by clarifying my terms. In the l~gal context, 
both moral rights and consequentialist analyses are used to dis-
cern when one person or group may properly use force against 
another person or group-including the enforcement author-
ized by legal institutions. Moral rights are typically viewed as 
describing claims to enforcement based solely on the protected 
interests of individuals or discrete groups. Once the scope of 
these protect~d interests is defined, any interference with these 
interests is· said to be a violation of the rights of the person or 
group. On this view, the use of force is justified-either pre-
sumptively (prima facie) or absolutely-to prevent or rectify 
such a rights violation. Conversely, if an action is consistent 
with moral rights, for~e may not jusdy be used to prevent or 
alter it. 
In contrast, a consequential analysis typically judges the mer-
its of using legal force by the consequences such actions are 
likely to have for everyone in a particular society. Consequen-
tialist analysis deems an action legally permissible if the benefi-
cial consequences of permitting the action (less the harm 
caused by such actions) exceed the beneficial consequences of 
prohibiting it (less the harm. caused by legal prohibition). Con-
versely, an action is deemed to be subject to legal prohibition 
when the net harmful consequences of permitting the action 
exceed the net harmful consequences of prohibiting it. 
In jurisprudence, arguments from ·~ustice" based on rights 
are sometimes considered to be matters of principle, while ar-
guments from "utility" based on legal consequences are often 
referred to as matters ofpolicy.8 Those who doubt the value of 
any moral rights analysis are likely to assert that a change in the 
law exclusively reflects policy preferences and that courts are 
less competent than legislatures to render such "utilitarian" 
judgments. Even among those who accept the value of a moral 
rights analysis, the competency of courts to evaluate conduct 
continuity. See Epstein, The Static Conception of the Common Law, 9 J. LEe. STUD. 253 
(1980). An adequate evolutionary account oflaw must explain both. The collective use 
and evolution of concepts is examined in great detail in 1 S. ToULMIN, HuMAN UNDER-
STANDING (1972). Much of the account presented here is informed by Toulmin's 
approach. 
'8. Cj. R. DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 90 (1977) ("Arguments of principle 
are arguments intended to establish an individual right; arguments of policy are argu-
ments intended to establish a collective goal."). 
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according to some set of moral rights is controversial. 9 
Let me emphasize that these definitions greatly simplify a 
very long and very rich debate over the true contents of the two 
approaches. Indeed, in recent years thinkers on each side of the 
gulf between rights and consequences have taken strides to re-
duce the gulf that divides them. 10 Despite the undeniable so-
phistication of these approaches, however, it is the simple, not 
the complex, conceptions of t4ese ideas that are persistently 
used to demonstrate the alleged incompatibility of rights and 
consequences. The appeal of examples such as those discussed 
above, 11 lies precisely in their ability to reduce the moral rights 
and consequentialist positions to the simple tenets I have just 
sketched so that the paradoxical question-which comes first, 
rights or consequences?-cannot be avoided. 
What would it mean .to claim that moral rights and conse-
quentialist analyses are compatible? To the extent that adher-
ents to mofal rights or 'C:onsequentialism are committed to a 
reliance on qne of these modes of analysis to the complete ex-
clusion of the other, these philosophies are truly and hope-
lessly incompatible. Consider this description by, philosopher J. 
L. Mackie of.the difference between rights-based and utilitarian 
analyses: 
The fundamental point of contrast, and conflict, between 
utilitariaJ1 and rights-based views is that the former, at least 
in their basic theory, aggregate the interests or preferences 
of all the persons or parties who are being taken into ac-
count, whereas the latter insist, to the end, on the separate-
ness of persons ..... · 
Of course this does not mean that a utilitarian must liter-
ally deny that persons are separate, or that any utilitarian has 
ever done so. What it means is that this separateness does no 
work in the utilitarian method of determining what is good 
or just, that in the utilitarian calculus the desires, or the sa tis-
9. Cf McConnell, A Moral Realist Defense of Constitutional Democracy, 64 CH1.-KENT L. 
REV. 89, IOO (I988) ("To say that there are principles of natural right is not to say that 
judges have the immediate power to enforce them."). Note that in his article, Professor 
McConnell consistently refers to "natural right" rather than the historically distinct 
approach to justice based on natural rights. For a brief description of the difference, see 
Mack, Comment: A Costly Road to Natural Law, I2 liARV. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 753, 754-56 
(I989) (distinguishing between classical theories of natural law or natural right and 
modern theories of natural rights). 
IO. See UTILITY AND RIGHTS (R.G. Frey ed. I984); Alexander, Pursuing the Good-Indi· 
rectly, 95 ETHICS 3I5 (I985); Gray, Indirect Utility and Fundamental Rights, Soc. PHIL. & 
PoL'Y, Spring I984, at 73; Laycock, The Ultimate Unity of Rights and Utilities, 64 TEX. L. 
REv. 407 (I985). 
II. See supra note I and accompanying text. 
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factions, of different individuals are all weighed together in 
the way in which a single thoroughly rational egoist would 
weigh together all his own· desires or satisfactions: on a utili-
tarian view, transferring a satisfaction from one 'person to 
another, while pr~serving its magnitude, makes no morally 
significant difference. 12 
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Reconciling these positions would be like squaring the circle. 
Showing that moral rights and consequences were equ!ll part-
ners within the legal enterprise would constitute a rejection, 
not a reconciliation, of these two views. A showing of compati-
bility would not, however, be a rejection of the central values or 
core concerns-protecting rights and achieving beneficial con-
sequences--of each of these philosophies. To the contrary, it 
would simultaneously affirm both core concerns as opposed to 
one or the other and would try to show how and why each has 
an important role to play in the legal enterprise. 
A truly "compatibilist"-to use Christopher Wonnell's help-
ful term 15-account of these core concerns requires more than 
a showing that moral rights and consequentialist analyses reach 
the same results in most cases. The argument that moral rights 
are justified on utilitarian grounds-as both Richard Epstein 
and Christopher Wonnell argue in their contributions to this 
symposium 14--operates well within the dominant hierarchical 
approach. Rather than trying to justify one mode of analysis in 
terms of the other, a truly compatibilist approach would, in my 
view, try to show how moral rights and consequentialist modes 
of analysis can both be useful components of a more compre-
hensive evaluative method. Nonetheless, if it is true that in 
most cases a sound moral rights analysis converges on much 
the same results as a sound consequentialist analysis, such a 
showing would suggest two important respects in which moral 
rights and consequentialist analyses are functionally 
compatible. 
First, if both methods generally reach the same result in en-
12. Mackie, Rights, .Utility, and Universalization in Um.I'IY AND RIGIITS, supra note 10, at 
86-87. As Jeremy Waldron points out, utilitarianism is just one kind of consequentialist 
analysis. See Waldron, Comment: Wonnell on Rights and E.ffo:iencJ, 12 HARv. J.L. & PuB. 
PoL'Y 873, 874 (1989) ("Some rights may embody the indirect pursuit of good conse-
quences • • . . Others may represent a commitment to a particular consequence taken 
to be specially important in itself.") (footnote omitted). 
13. See Wonnell, Four Challmges Facing a Compatibilist Philosophy, 12 HARV. J.L. & PuB. 
PoL'Y 836 (1989). 
14. See Epstein, The Utilitarian Foundations of Natural Law, 12 HARv.J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 
713 (1989); Wonnell, supra note 13. 
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tirely different ways, then each method can provide an analytic 
check on the other. Because any of our analytic methods may 
err or may be used to deceive, we can use one method to con-
firm the results that appear to be supported by the other. Anal-
ogously, after adding a column of figures from top to bottom, 
we sometimes double check the sum by adding the figures 
again from bottom to top or by using a calculator. Just as we 
rely upon institutional rivalries between branches of govern-
ment to protect against error and deception, we may rely upon 
"conceptual rivalries" between different methods of normative 
inquiry for the same reason. In sum, one way that moral rights 
and consequentialist modes of analysis may be functionally 
compatible is by providing a conceptual "checks and balances" 
mechanism by which errors in our normative analysis may be 
detected and prevented. 
Second, only if we rely upon multiple modes of analysis can 
we assess the degree of confidence we should have in a conclu-
sion recommended by any single mode of analysis. Because we 
know that no evaluative method is infallible, the more valid 
methods there are that point in the same direction, the more 
confident we may be that this is the direction in which to move. 
Conversely, a divergence of results between two valid methods 
suggests problems that may exist at the level of application of a 
method or deep inside the method itself. Divergent results 
from competing methodologies recommend not only that we 
proceed cautiously, but that we carefully reconsider our meth-
ods and their application to discover, if possible, the source of 
the divergence. 15 In sum, a second way that an analysis of both 
moral rights and consequences may be functionally compatible 
is that only when we rely on competing modes of analysis can 
convergence of results beget confidence and divergence of re-
sults stimulate discovery. 
The ability of two completely different methods to reach the 
same results in most cases suggests that each method is grasp-
ing, however imperfectly, something "real" about the world it 
is seeking to explain. If each method were unrelated to any fun-
damental reality, we would expect only a random convergence 
of results. To put the matter less metaphysically, considering 
how different moral rights and consequentialist analyses are 
15. I consider two examples of such divergence in Barnett, FOTtUJord: The Ninth 
Amendment and Constitutional legitimacy, 64 CHI.·KENT L. REv. 37, 44-46 (1988). 
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from each other, only if both methods have an underlying va-
lidity would they so frequendy converge on the same results. 16 
Perhaps by better understanding the merits of each methodol-
ogy we can begin to unravel the rights-consequences paradox. 
THE APPEAL OF MoRAL RIGHTs AND 
CoNSEQ.UENTIALIST ANALYSES 
To resolve any paradox we must take several steps back from 
the analytic framework that produced it. We have taken the first 
step by suggesting why most schools of thought have felt im-
pelled to adopt either moral rights or consequences as their 
.exclusive mode of analysis or have elevated one of these to the 
top of a hierarchical analysis. A hierarchy provides a way of 
resolving conflicts between the two modes of analysis and 
avoids the apparent need to balance two competing values. The 
next step is to examine why some gravitate to moral rights anal-
ysis while others are attracted to consequentialism. I suspect 
that adherents to one school or the other are attracted to the 
different truths that lie at the core of each evaluative method 
and that the preference for one method as opposed to the 
other depends upon the priority one attaches to these truths. 
Moral rights analysis is appealing because it takes seriously 
the individual and the associations to which individuals belong. 
Moral rights are seen as protecting the highly valued "private" 
sphere.17 Put another way, moral rights analysis views the ac-
tions of individuals and associations from the perspective of the 
individual and the association. The specialized evaluative tech-
niques it employs are conducive to elaborating this perspective. 
Because we all are individuals and members of associations, the 
idea of moral rights has wide appeal. We have a natural interest 
16. Loren Lomasky has suggested to me another possible explanation of this pur· 
poned convergence: it is bogus. One analytic method is simply taking a free ride on the 
other. Either natural rights thinkers are doing seat-of-the-pants consequentialist calcu-
lation or consequentialists are seeking to justify just those rights that have come to be 
accepted as imponant on moral grounds. Although this possibility is wonh serious 
consideration, in the balance of this Foreword I will assume that, when it occurs, the 
convergence of moral rights and consequentialist analyses is genuine. 
17. Ste l..omasky,supra note 1, at 777 (arguing that rights are powerful because "they 
erect morally potent barriers that others are not at Iibeny to cross even if there are 
otherwise cogent reasons supponing such encroachment"); see also Waldron, When jus-
lice Replaas Affiction: The Need for Rights, 11 HARv.j.L. & Pus. PoL'Y 625 (1988) ("[11he 
structure of rights is not constitutive of social life, but instead [is] to be understood as a 
position of fallback and security in case other constituent elements of social relations 
ever come apan."). 
618 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 12 
in the protection of our rights, and our empathy causes us also 
to be concerned about the protection of the rights of others. 
In contrast, consequential analysis is appealing because it 
takes seriously the wide-reaching and highly dispersed effects 
that the actions of individuals and associations may often have 
on others. Consequential analysis is seen as protecting a "pub-
lic" sphere. Although consequential analysis is often couched 
in terms of how "society" views the actions of the individual 
and association, one can avoid this anthropomorphic metaphor 
by saying that consequential analysis views the actions of indi-
viduals and associations from the perspective of the other per-
sons with whom they live in society}8 The specialized 
evaluative techniques it employs are conducive to elaborating 
this perspective. Because we are all affected by the actions of 
other individu;lls and associations of which we are not mem-
bers, the consequentialist perspective also has wide appeal. We 
are concerned about the consequences to us of other persons' 
actions and our empathy causes us also to be concerned about 
the consequences of such actions for others. 
Viewed in this light both moral rights and consequentialist 
analyses provide personal reasons for action. 19 At the risk of 
oversimplification, moral rights attempt to define a privileged 
sphere within which each person can act; consequential analysis 
attempts to gauge the effects that such privileged actions have 
on each person. At some point, however, both of these per-
spectives lose their appeal. Moral right_s analysis is unappealing 
when it advocates the protection of moral rights "though the 
heavens may fall. " 20 Most people care about the domain of dis-
cretionary actions that rights protect, but also would care about 
the falling of the heavens. Consequentialist analysis is unap-
pealing when it sacrifices the domain of action protected by 
moral rights in the interest of a completely impersonal stan-
dard of value-utils, wealth maximization, etc. Most people do 
18. Ardent communitarians who believe in a "public" entity and a "public good" 
above and apart from the persons and association in a given society are probably not 
consequentialists, so this recasting of consequentialism away from the "society-as-a 
sentient-entity" metaphor should not greatly disturb them. 
19. The issue of personal and impersonal reasons for action is discussed in Alexan-
der, supra note 6, at 815-17; Lomasky, supra note I, at 781-94; and Mack, supra note 9, 
at 756-59. 
20. See Epstein, supra note 14, at 713 ("[I]f consequences never count, then disas-
trous consequences cannot count either."); Lomasky, supra note 1, at 777 ("The will-
ingness to countenance acceptance of the inferior [outcome] may be seen as the 
epitome of practical irrationality."). 
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not want to sacrifice all of their liberty to act even if such sacri-
fices significantly benefit others. 
The paradox of rights and consequences, of justice and util-
ity, may be viewed as an aspect of the alleged paradox of classi-
cal liberalism. On the one hand, in contrast with political 
elitism, liberalism sought to protect the dignity of the common 
person, meaning all persons qua human beings. On the other 
hand, liberalism always acknowledged the need to prevent the 
actions of some from adversely affecting the interests of others. 
Nor did individualist-flavored liberalism ever deny the impor-
tance of the community in which individuals reside. Liberalism 
always lay betwixt and between these two great concerns, a 'po-
sition that has led some critics of liberalism to complain of its 
internal dialectic, inherent tensions, or fundamental contradic-
tions. It would be mistaken to conclude that this undeniable 
tension betWeen individual and community, between self and 
others, is a contradiction in a logical sense. Aristode, no stran-
ger to logic (albeit aristotelian), held that virtue consisted in 
seeking the mean between extremes.21 Far from representing a 
middle-of-the-road position, 22 liberalism, like aristotelian vir-
tue, attempts to supply a conceptual and institutional structure 
that is exquisitely poised between the individual and others-a 
structure that is scrutinized from the perspective of both rights 
and consequences. 
Given the impossibility of assessing the merits of each per-
son's ev~ry action, the conceptual or intellectual aspect of the 
liberal endeavor must be able to assess types of human action 
from the perspective of the actor as well as from the perspec-
tive of those who are affected by these actions. Moral rights 
concepts and a consequential analysis of these concepts reflect 
these different perspectives. The institutional setting__ in which 
these concepts are developed and used must ensure that both 
perspectives are adequately represented. 
Those actions that pass muster from both points of view-or 
neither-are "easy cases" in which we can be quite confident in 
21. See L FUllER, THE PROBLEMS OF jURISPRUDENCE 31 (tent. ed. 1949)-("[T]he cen; 
tral notion that virtue is a state of balance between forces that pull a man in different 
directions is one of the most important and fruitful parts of Aristotle's ethical 
thought."). 
22. See id. ("For Aristotle, the middle. way was not the soft way, but the hard way, the 
way that took skill and competence and from which the clumsy and ill-favored were 
most likely to fall."). 
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our judgment. The actions about which justice and expediency 
provide conflicting assessments, such as the hypotheticals 
given earlier,23 are "hard cases" that call upon us to reconsider 
our analysis or further refine our analytic techniques. Until 
such time as a conflict between modes of analysis is resolved, 
we must tread cautiously, and the fact that caution is required is 
worth knowing. Indeed, one of the greatest virtues of moral 
rights analysis is its ability to obviate the need for costly and 
potentially tragic "social experiments" that may be recom-
mended by faulty consequentialist analyses.24 Even when such 
experiments are destructive, there is often no efficient way to 
terminate them. It is far better to use a moral rights analysis to 
look before one leaps. 25 
Still, the fact that we must act in the face of conflicting modes 
of analysis suggests that the compatibilist picture I have 
painted to this point is still seriously incomplete. How is it that 
we· are not frozen in our tracks until conflicts between moral 
rights and consequentialist perspectives are resolved? Perhaps 
there is yet another mechanism of choice that functions along-
side analyses of rights and consequences. Understanding the 
nature of this mechanism and its relationship to moral rights 
and consequentialist analyses will further help resolve the para-
doxical relationship of these two competing techniques. 
THE MisSING LINK: LEGAL EvoLUTION AND THE RuLE OF LAw 
I have suggested that types of human action should be as-
sessed from the perspective of the actor and also from the per-
spective of those affected by the action and that these 
perspectives are represented by analyses of moral rights and 
consequences. However, the compatible roles of these compet-
ing modes of analysis cannot be fully appreciated without con-
sidering the shortcomings of any analytic technique, whether 
that of moral rights or that of consequentialism. 
The rhetoric of philosophers and economists would lead one 
to think that a comprehensive analysis of moral rights or a com-
23. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
24. I have argued elsewhere that the legal prohibition of intoxicating drugs is one 
example of this. See Barnett, Curing the Drug-Law Addition: The Harmful Side Efficts of Legal 
ProhibitUm, in DEALING WITH DRUGS 73 (R. Hamowy ed. 1987). 
25. See Barnett, Public Decisions and Private Rights (book review), CRJM. juST. Ennes, 
Summer-Fall 1984, ·at 50 (discussing the inherent weaknesses of public policy analysis 
unguided by moral rights). 
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prehensive analysis of consequences was capable of discovering 
the full panoply of norms on which law should be based. But 
neither mode of analysis can accomplish such a feat. Instead, 
both rights theorists and consequentialists get their starting 
points from conventional practice. 26 In the Anglo-American 
legal systems, the conventions of practice have typically been 
generated by the spontaneously evolving process known as the 
common law.27 As Lon Fuller put it, 
[i]t can be said that law is the oldest and richest of the social 
sciences .. : . Economists who have exhausted the resources 
of their own science turn to the law for insight into the na-
ture of the institutional arrangements essential for a free 
economy. Philosophers find in the law a discipline lacking in 
their own sometimes errant studies-the discipline, namely, 
that comes of accepting the responsibility for rendering deci. 
sions by which men··can shape their lives.28 
Although he uses a hierarchical metaphor, Charles Fried has 
made a similar observation: 
The picture I have ... is of philosophy proposing an elabo-
rate structure of arguments and considerations that descend 
from on high but stop some twenty feet above the ground. It 
is the peculiar task of the law to complete this structure of 
ideals alld values, to bring it down to earth; and to complete 
it so that it is firmly and concretely seated, so that it shelters 
real hUJilan beings against the storms of passion and conflict. 
Now that last twenty feet may not be the most glamorous 
part of the building-it is the part where the plumbing and 
utilities are housed. But it is an indispensable part. The lofty 
philosophical edifice does not determine what the last twenty 
feet are, yet if the legal foundation is to support the whole, 
then ideals and values must constrain, limit, inform, and in-
spire the foundation-but no more. The law is really an in-
dependent, distinct part of the structure of value. 29 
That philosophical and economic analyses are typically used 
to subject established conventional principles to critical scru-
tiny is of methodological significance. It suggests that, even 
taken together, moral rights and consequentialist analyses can-
not explain the discovery oflegal norms that would satisfy their 
26. The mechanism by which conventional norms spontaneously evolve is discussed 
in R. SuGDEN, THE EcoNOMics OF RIGHTS, Co-oPERATION AND WELFARE (1986). 
27. See L. Fuu.ER, .ANATOMY oF nu: LAw 84-108 (1968) (presenting ten distinctive 
characteristics of the common-law process). 
~8. /d. at S. 
29. Fried, Rights and 1M Common Law, in UTILnY AND RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 231. 
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critical demands. It suggests that moral rights and consequen-
tialist analyses are just a part of how legal norms are discov-
ered. Something more is required. Two years ago in this space 
I suggested that the attempt to discover legal norms depends 
upon both tradition and reason. 30 Tradition provides us with a 
starting point-that is, a set of conventional norms that must 
then be subjected to critical reason. This observation may seem 
both obvious and hopelessly vague. The discussion to follow 
should render this approach more useful and more specific. 
Moral rights and consequentialism are modes of rational 
analysis that are quite useful to criticize the "received" or tradi-
tional wisdom. Unlike philosophers or economists, however, 
judges must decide cases even in the absence of an iron-clad 
moral rights or consequentialist analysis. Indeed, for most of 
our legal history there was little such rational analysis available 
at all. The need to resolve a multitude of real disputes, each 
with its own peculiar facts, is the engine that drives legal evolu-
tion forward.31 This engine produces a body of reported out-
comes of countless cases in which contending parties have both 
laid claim to some resource (including the resource that would 
be used to satisfy a monetary damage award) and the reasons 
given by judges' for these outcomes (as well as dissenting and 
concurring judicial opinions). From this diverse body of out-
comes and reasons emerge dominant conventions-sometimes 
called the "majority rule•'-and other rival conventions that 
may be called the "minority rule."32 For example, the law of 
undisclosed agency developed in spite of, rather than because 
of, the prevailing theories of contractual obligation.33 Yet most 
theorists who were puzzled by this "anomaly" were nonethe-
less generally in agreement with its content. 
Once discovered by legal institutions, these evolved rules 
may then be subjected to critical reason in the form of a mix-
ture of moral rights and consequentialist analysis. Yet, for the 
30. See Barnett, Foreword: judicial Conservatism v. A Principled judicial Activism, 10 HARV. 
j.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 273, 281-86 (1987). 
31. That the imperative of deciding actual cases leads to a distinctive and indispen-
sable mode of analysis is explored in great detail in A. joNSEN & S. TOULMIN, THE 
ABUSE OF CAsUISTRY (1988). 
32. See L. FuLLER, supra note 27, at 93-94 (discussing the constructive role that con-
flicting opinions play in the generation of legal norms). 
33. See Barnett, Squaring Undisclosed Agency With Contract Theory, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1969, 
2000-03 (1988) (discussing the law of undisclosed agency as an example of a spontane-
ously developed body of doctrine that is consistent with a rights analysis). 
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traditional conventions produced by the adjudicative process to 
provide more than a random starting point for a critical analy-
sis based on moral rights and consequences, it is. not enough 
that cases just be resolved. The way disputes are rel?olved deter-
mines whether the results reached by a legal system can evolve 
into promising conventional standards of right conduct that 
can then be subjected to and, in the main, survive the norma-
tive scrutiny of critical reason based on moral.rights and· conse-
quentialist analysis. Only if the processes that resolve disputes 
do so in certain ways can we take the views we ;receive from 
these processes as a form of wisdom. Similarly, the way that 
legislation is enacted either supports or undermines the likeli-
hood that such legislation is substantively legitimate. 34 The 
form that enables dispute resolution processes to produce 
'Judgments" that are ·knowledgeable enough to usually with-
stand critical scrutiny on the basis of moral rights or conse-
quences can be summarized under the rubric, "the rule oflaw." 
The best summary of these formal constraints was provided by 
Lon Fuller.35 He called these constraints the "internal morality 
of law."36 Decisions made according to the formal standards 
provided by the rule of law are capable of producing an elabo-
rate set of decisions consisting of both results (the facts of the 
case plus who won) and articulated rationales for the results. 
When a sufficiently elaborate set of decisions (results and ratio-
nales) has developed it becomes possible to subject this set of 
practices to systematic rational appraisal-including the ap-
praisal provided by what Fuller termed the "external morality 
oflaw."37 
M. Stt Barnett, supra note 15, at 47-64. 
85. Ste L. Fuu.ER;supra note 2, at 38-39 (listing eight formal characteristics oflegal-
ity); Fuller, The Fonns and limits of Adjudicatifm, 92 HARv. L. REv. 353 (19~8) (discussing 
the formal requirements. of adjudication). 
36. L. FullER, supra note 2, at 96. 
What I have called the internal morality of law is in this sense a procedural 
version. of natural law, though to avoid misunderstanding the word "proce-
dural" should be assigned a special and expanded sense so that it would in-
clude, for example, a substantive accord between official action and enacted 
law. The term "procedural" is, however, broadly appropriate as indicating 
that we are concerned, not with the substantive aims of legal rules, but with 
the ways in which a system of rules for governing human conduct must be 
constructed and administered if it is to be efficacious .and at the same time 
remain what it purports to be. 
/d. at 96-97. 
37. /d. at 96. 
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THE LEGAL ENTERPRISE AND THE PROBLEM 
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At this point one can expect the following response from phi-
losophers: although you say that moral rights and consequen-
tialist modes of analysis are both useful ways of improving 
upon past practices that have evolved as part of a process gov-
erned by the rule of law, you have not identified your criterion 
or criteria of improvement. Although you say that the concepts 
that are the product of legal evolution according to the rule of 
law must serve the proper ends of the legal enterprise, you 
have not identified what these ends are. Unless we know the 
standard by which improvement is to be measured, how can we 
say that either method improves upon current practices? Un-
less we know the ends of the legal system, how can we know 
they are being served? To answer the question of ends, the 
argument proceeds, requires a choice between the normative 
standard of justice based on moral rights or the normative stan-
dard of utility based on the maximization of beneficial conse-
quences. In making this choice we cannot escape the essential 
incompatibility of rights and consequences. Ultimately, one ap-
proach must be subordinate to the other~ 
Although I concede that some idea of "improvement" is 
needed to appreciate the roles played by moral rights, conse-
quential analysis, and the iule of law, I reject the idea that our 
conception of improvement need be based exclusively on any 
one of these three perspectives. 38 All three approaches are 
problem-solving devices. Viewed in this light all of these modes 
of analysis are means, not ends.39 To provide the requisite idea 
of improvement, one must identify, not so much an ultimate 
standard of value, but the ultimate problem that the enterprise of 
law with its particular blend of formal and substantive values is 
seeking to solve. We can then see how traditional processes 
based on the rule of law and such rational modes of analysis as 
those provided by moral rights and consequentialist methods 
38. In this essay I have not considered the views of some that the rule of law is the 
ultimate source of norms, a view that today is associated with many judicial conserva· 
tives. I did briefly discuss this approach in Barnett, Foreword: Can justice and the Rult of 
Law Be Reconciltd1, 11 HARv.j.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 599 (1988). . 
39. Set L. FULLER, Means and Ends, in PRINCIPLES OF SoCIAL ORDER 47 (K. Winston 
ed. 1980) (discussing the contextual nature of the distinction between means and 
ends). 
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all contribute to solving the relevant problem.40 Moreover, 
other processes and methods of rational analysis may be useful 
as well.41 
To sum up the analysis thus far, the first step toward resolv-
ing the paradox of rights and consequences was to reject the 
hierarchical approach to rights and consequences and to enter-
tain the prospect that both were equal partners in the legal en-
terprise. The second step was to appreciate why each mode of 
analysis is attractive. The third step was to acknowledge the 
role that an evolving tradition or practice governed by formal 
criteria known as .the rule of law plays in providing cases and 
promising precepts that can be subjected to rational scrutiny 
on the basis of rights and consequences. The next step is to 
identify the underlying function or end of the legal enterprise 
so that we can better recognize moral and consequential meth-
ods that contribute to the improvement of the precepts pro-
duced by institutions governed by the rule oflaw. We need to 
discern the problem or problems for which moral rights, conse-
quentialist analysis, and the rule of law are offered as solutions. 
According to classical liberals, the fundamental problem fac-
ing every society may be summarized as follows: Given that the 
actions of each person in society are likely to have efficts on others, on 
what conditions is it possible for persons to live and pursue happiness in 
society with other persons? "Social order" is the term that has tradi-
tionally been used to describe the state of affairs that permits 
every person to live and pursue happiness in society with 
others.42 Unfortunately, this term has come to be associated 
40. Cf. S. ToULMIN, supra note 7, at 185: 
Within a historically developing scientific enterprise, ... the significance of 
our concepts can be adequately shown •.. only by viewing all the elements of 
the science-subject-matter, formal entailments, explanatory procedures, and 
all-within a larger framework, and by demonstrating how_.,n what condi-
tions, in what kinds of case, and with.what degree of precision-the explana-
tory procedures and/or arguments within which the concept is given a 
meaning can successfully be used to make sense of the relevant subject-
matter. · 
41. Rational bargaining theory, for example, is an example of a distinctive technique 
that intersects both moral rights and consequential analyses. See, e.g., Coleman, Hecka-
thorn & Maser, A Bargaining Theory Approach to Default Provisions and Disclosure Rules in 
Contract Law, 12 HARv.J.L & PuB. PoL'Y 639 (1989). 
42. F .A. Hayek offers the following definition of the general concept of "order": 
[A] state of affairs in which a multiplicity of elements of various kinds are so 
related to each other that we may learn from our acquaintance with some 
spacial or temporal part of the whole to form correct expectations concerning 
the rest, or at least expectations which have a good chance of proving correct. 
I F.A. HAYEK, LAw, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 36 (1973). 
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with ordering schemes imposed from above by totalitarian re-
gimes.43 For this reason, perhaps, the term "coordination" bet-
ter captures the problem of achieving an "order of actions."44 
Whatever the terminology, some way must be found to permit 
persons to act so that their actions do not obstruct the actions 
of others. 
This rendition of the fundamental problem of human society 
contains a number of "liberal" presuppositions. First, liberals 
recognize the existence and value of individual persons. Sec-
ond, liberals place value on the ability of all persons to live and 
pursue ··happiness. Third, liberals use the phrase "pursuit of 
happiness" because they reject the idea that one particular 
style of life is to be preferred above all others for everyone. 
Fourth, liberals recognize that people live in society with others 
and that the actions of one may have both positive and negative 
effects on others. Fifth, liberals maintain that it is possible to 
find conditions or ground rules that would provide all or nearly 
all persons living in society the opportunity to pursue happi-
ness without depriving others of the same opportunity. 
Of course, although they are widely shared, each of these 
presuppositions is and has always been controversial. For this 
reason, liberalism is and has always been controversial. Where 
controversy arises over any of these presuppositions, it must be 
thrashed out in the appropriate forum. Assuming, however, 
that a consensus is reached on these presuppositions, then the 
next step is to ask how it is that the problem of achieving coor-
dination is actually to be solved. In the next section, I shall sug-
gest the role that natural rights play in addressing this 
problem. 
RESOLVING THE PARADOX: THE NATURAL RIGHTS ALTERNATIVE 
The term "natural rights" means many things to many peo-
ple, and I shall not try to compare my conception with that of 
others. Indeed, given the many preconceptions about natural 
rights, it may well be best to abandon the term altogether. Cur-
rent prejudices notwithstanding, however, the natural rights 
43. See id. at 35 ("The term 'order' has, of course, a long history in the social sci-
ences, ••• but in recent times it has generally been avoided, largely because of the 
ambiguity of its meaning and its frequent association with authoritarian views. We can· 
not do without it, however .•.. "). 
44. See id. at 98-101 (discussing the role played by legal institutions in maintaining 
"an ongoing order of actions."). 
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tradition has much of value to offer and it would be disingenu-
ous to adopt a natural rights methodology without giving the 
tradition its due. 
For present purposes it is enough to identify two significa~t 
features of natural rights thinking. First, writers in the classical 
natural rights tradition were attempting to address in a realistic 
manner the problem of social order. Sometimes they referred 
to this as the "common good," referring not to some· public 
good that transcends the persons living in society with others, 
but to those basic requirements that all such persons share in 
common.45 Second, they addressed this problem with a mix-
ture of what we would today consider moral rights and conse-
quentialist analyses.46 
Let me briefly summarize the liberal approach to natural 
rights.47 When living "in society with others, humans need to 
.act. Their actions will require the use of physical resources, in-
cluding their bodies but, because of scarcity, their actions will 
unavoidably affect others. Given that nearly all human action 
will affect others in some way, how are actions to be regulated 
so as to permit individuals to act in pursuit of happiness with-
out impeding the similar pursuit by others? To answer this, a 
natural rights approach attempts to establish an appropriate 
time and place for the actions of different persons by examin-
ing certain features of the world that are common to all, at least 
under circumstances we would consider to be normal. Normal 
circumstances give rise to precepts (rules and principles) that 
45. Cf. D. HuME, A TREATISE oF HuMAN NATURE 484 (L Selby-Bigge &: P. Nidditch 
2d ed. 1978) (1st ed. 1739-1740): 
Tho' the rules of justice be arlijicial, they are not arbitrary. Nor is the expres-
sion improper to call them Laws of Nature; if by natural we understand what is 
common to any species, or even if we confine it to mean what is inseparable 
from the species. . 
46. Because a strict dichotomy between rights and consequences had yet to solidifY, 
these writers often moved from one mode of analysis to the other with little warning. 
For this reason, contemporary analysts committed to an unbridgeable dichotomy are 
likely to arrive at starkly conflicting interpretations of classical writings in the natural 
rights tradition depending upon which of the two dimensions of natural rights analysis 
is stressed. Compare Miller, Economic E.fficiency and the Loclcean Proviso, 10 HARv. J.L. &: 
PuB. PoL'Y 401 (1987) (attributing to Locke a utilitarian approach) with Valcke, Loclce on 
Property: A Phwsophicallnterpretation, 12 HARv.J.L. &: Pus. PoL'Y 941 (1989) (attributing 
·to Locke a moral rights approach). According to a compatibilist approach, both these 
interpretations can be useful to understand Locke's theory of naturill rights, except 
insofar as each interpretation denies the validity of the other. 
4 7. I have presented a more elaborate application of this method in Barnett, Pursuing 
justice in a Free Society: Part One-Powerv. Liberty, CRIM.jUST. Ennes, Summer-Fall1985, 
at 50. 
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presumptively govern time and place unless it can be shown 
that extraordinary circumstances exist that would support the 
creation of an exception-itself defeasible-to the rule.48 The 
contours of this scheme of defeasible precepts and exceptions 
define in general terms the natural rights of all persons-rights 
that are not themselves normally defeasible. 
The basic precepts produced at this stage are quite abstract. 
For persons to live and pursue happiness in society with others, 
persons need to act at their own discretion. This is made possi-
ble by recognizing a sphere of jurisdiction over physical re-
sources~including their own bodies-that provides persons 
with discretionary control-liberty-over these resources. Put 
another way, persons need to be at liberty to act within the 
realm of their jurisdiction-a jurisdiction that has both tempo-
ral and spatial dimensions. 
The shorthand term for this jurisdiction is "property rights," 
with property given its older meaning of "proprietorship." 
One is said to have property in an object or one's body.49 Prop-
erty, in this sense, refers not to an object, but to a right to con-
trol physical resources-a right that cannot normally be 
displaced without the consent or wrongful conduct of the right 
holder. Some of these property rights are alienable and others 
are inalienable. 50 Persons need to be able to consensually 
tqmsfer their alienable rights or jurisdiction to others.51 The 
shorthand term for this precept is "freedom of contract." 
Persons also need institutions that enable them to enforce 
their rights, but these institutions must be subject to substan-
tive and procedural constraints to ensure that the institutions 
whose mission it is to protect rights do not end up violating 
them. The substantive constraints are provided by the general 
48. The historical practice of using presumptive precepts within different stages of 
analysis and the vinues of this technique are discussed in Epstein, Pkading and Presump-
tionJ, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 556 (1973); see also Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonabk, 98 
HARv. L REv. 949 (1985) (distinguishing between "flat" and "structured" modes of 
legal analysis). I have used this method to resolve some vexing issues of contract theory 
and doctrine in Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 CoLUM. L REv. 269, 309-10, 
318 (1986) [hereinafter Barnett, A Consent Theory]; see also Barnett, supra note 33, at 
1993-99. 
49. See, e.g.,J. LocKE, An Essay Concerning The True Origin Extent and End of Civil Govern-
ment, in Two TREATISES OF CML GOVERNMENT, ch. V, § 27 (London 1690) ("every man 
has a property in his own pmon"). 
50. See Barnett, Contract Remedies and Ina/ienabk Rights, Soc. PHIL. & PoL'Y, Autumn 
1986, at 179 (discussing the bases of inalienable rights and the implication of inaliena-
bility for contract remedies). 
51. &e Barnett, A Consent Theory, supra note 48, at 291-309. 
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precepts of justice governing the acquisition, use, and transfer 
of resources. The procedural constraints are provided by the 
set of principles sometimes referred to as the rule oflaw. 
A natural rights analysis does not rest content with generat-
ing a set of substantive and procedural precepts of justice and 
the rule of law from general observations about the nature of 
the human condition. It also "tests" the conclusions such an 
analysis provides by examining the consequences of adhering 
to these precepts. This may be done hypothetically or empiri-
cally. If it is revealed that a particular form of jurisdiction actu-
ally retards rather than enhances the ability of persons to 
pursue happiness in society, this showing does not automati-
cally refute the rights being scrutinized. Instead, the analysis 
must return to the legal precepts used to elaborate moral rights 
to see if the original precept can be refined to better deal with 
the problem or if an entirely different precept would be better. 
Such a process seeks what John Rawls has called a "reflective 
equilibrium"52 among competing considerations. 
Let me offer an example to illustrate this multifaceted ap-
proach. The liberal natural rights analysis just presented sug-
gests that the consent of the rights-holder lies at the heart of 
contractual obligation. 58 In practice, courts developed the 
"doctrine of consideration," which requires commitments to be 
"bargained for" to be enforceable. 54 Although this criterion of 
enforceability captures most consensual commitments to alien-
ate rights, it gradually became apparent that this precept was 
underinclusive. That is, it left unenforced a variety of "serious" 
commitments on which people are likely to rely to their detri-
ment-cases that came to be clustered under the rubric of 
"promissory estoppel. "55 
However, merely identifying a residual group of cases that 
seemed to be unsatisfactorily handled by the doctrine of bar-
gained-for consideration neither solves the problem nor en-
52. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF jusncE 48-50 (1970). 
53. See Barnett, A Consent Theory, supra note 48 (describing a "consent theory of 
contract"). 
54. See RESTATEMENr (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS§ 71(1), (2) (1979): 
(I) To constitute consideration, a performance or return promise must be 
bargained for. 
(2) A performance or return promise is bargained for if it is sought by the 
promisor in exchange for his promise and is given by the promisee in ex-
change for that promise. 
55. See Barnett, A Consent Theory, supra note 48, at 287-89. 
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sures that there is a genuine problem to be solved. Without 
some other analysis we cannot be sure that the source of our 
intuitive dissatisfaction does not lie in our intuitions rather 
than in the doctrine of consideration. When these aberrant 
cases are considered in light of a moral rights analysis, how-
ever, it becomes clear that, although they lack bargained-for 
commitments, many of these cases nonetheless involve some 
other manifestation of consent to be legally bound. From this 
observation we can begin to suspect that bargained-for consid-
eration should not be the exclusive means of establishing a 
consensual transfer of rights. Other indicia of consent, such as 
a formality or even silence in the face of substantial reliance, 
may also indicate the presence of consent. 56 
This example illustrates how the rule of law and a natural 
rights approach to justice based on an analysis of both moral 
rights and consequences can work together. The institutions 
governed by the rule oflaw developed a doctrine of bargained-
for consideration to help distinguish between enforceable and 
unenforceable· commitments. Although this legal precept was 
not logically deduced from first principles of justice, it was 
nonetheless consistent with and justified by a moral rights anal-
ysis insofar as it was a generally efficacious method of deter-
mining the existence of consent to alienate rights. As this 
precept came increasingly to dominate contract law, however, 
certain unbargained-for, but consensual, commitments went 
unenforced. Dissatisfaction with this consequence of the doc-
trine stimulated a reexamination of the legal precept in light of 
a moral rights analysis. This critical analysis revealed the limita-
tions of the doctrine of consideration and recommended ways 
by which the precepts governing contract law could be 
reformed. 
THE RIGHT AND THE GooD 
In my view, the moral rights and consequentialist compo-
nents of a natural rights approach support a view of rights as 
spheres of bounded individual and associational discretion to 
use physical resources. Rights allow persons and associations 
jurisdiction to decide how certain physical resources-includ-
56. For a fuller discussion of these issues, see Barnett &: Becker, Beyond Relianct: 
Promissory Eswppt~ Contract Fonnalities, and Misrtjmsentation, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 443 
(1987). 
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ing their own bodies-should be used. Such jurisdiction is 
bounded, and the boundaries must be enforced by institutions 
governed by the rule of law. These institutions, in turn, pro-
duce the cases and decisions that lead to important refinements 
of our understanding of the basic precepts of justice. Legal 
evolution requires a constant rotation among these modes of 
analysis-the rule oflaw and justice based on both moral rights 
and consequentialist analyses-and others as well. Viewed in 
static terms, this process may appear circular. Viewed as an ev-
·olutionary process, it more nearly resembles a bit on a drill, 
whose rotation permits it to penetrate solid wood. 
Determining the content of the rights that define-justice does 
not, however, exhaust the whole of moral inquiry. An analysis 
that identifies the rights people have with a bounded jurisdic-
tion to control physical resources does not stipulate how peo-
ple should go about exercising their rights. For example, 
should one be an egoist exercising one's rights solely to benefit 
oneself, an altruist exercising one's rights solely to benefit 
others, or somewhere in between? 
Natural rights theorists sometimes distinguished between 
perfect and imperfect rights and duties. Perfect rights referred 
to those rights that created an enforceable duty in others. Im-
perfect rights created duties ·that did not justify the use of coer-
.cion. 57 The natural rights analysis described above addresses 
only the question of enforceability. The question of unenforce-
able moral duties must be addressed by the broader moral in-
quiry know as ethics. 58 Much needless controversy about moral 
57. For a detailed treatment of the distinction drawn by classical natural rights theo-
rists between enforceable and unenforceable duties in the context of the theories of 
James Wilson, see Hills, The Reconciliation of Law and Liberty in james WILson, 12 HARv. J.L. 
Be PuB. PoL'Y 891 (1989). He summarizes Wilson's version as follows: 
[A] duty without a correlative right is an act that a pers.on ought to perform to 
reach his natural end but that may not be extorted from him by force, because 
no other person is impartial enough to be trusted with the power to enforce 
the duty. Duties that do entail correlative rights result from those negative 
rights of strict justice (do not kill, do not steal, etc.), which can be imple-
mented by force because all humans possess the minimum degree of imparti-
ality necessary to curb the excessive self-love of a murderer or thief. 
Id. at 924. 
58. Lon Fuller made a similar distinction between the morality of aspiration (what I 
am calling the ethical or good) and the morality of duty (what I am calling the right or 
just): 
The morality of aspiration ..• is the morality of the Good Life, of excellence, 
of the fullest realization of human powers .... Where the morality of aspira-
tion starts at the top of human achievement, the morality of duty starts at the 
bottom. It lays down the basic rules without which an ordered society is im-
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rights is generated by the idea that an adequate rights theory 
must address not only the problem of unjust conduct thatjusti-
fies legal enforcement, but also the problem of good or ethical 
conduct that justifies nonviolent sanctions. 
The general issue of good conduct far exceeds the domain of 
natural rights, with one significant exception. Although a natu-
ral rights analysis does not specify any particular theory of the 
good and seeks to permit the pursuit of differing conceptions 
of the good life, it does prevent, at least indirectly, certain con-
ceptions of the good from being achieved. A natural rights ap-
proach 'solves the problem of social order by placing certain 
restrictions on the means one may use to pursue happiness. 
Consequently and unavoidably, those who believe that their 
pursuit of happiness requires them to use the very means that 
are proscribed cannot be permitted to do so. For example, 
those who find their gratification in having intercourse with 
others against their will may not pursue this course of action, 
because this pursuit runs afoul of the principles of justice that 
make human life in society possible. Of course, such action is 
not only unjust, it is also morally despicable. That an action is 
morally despicable, however, is neither necessary nor sufficient 
to justify its legal prohibition. 
In sum, a liberal natural rights approach is neutral among 
those alternative ways of pursuing happiness, of which there 
are a great many, that are consistent with the basic require-
ments of social order. Because it prohibits conduct-whether 
viewed as morally good or bad-that violates the precepts of 
justice or right, it will unavoidably, but incidentally, prohibit 
some action that is morally bad. Persons who wish to pursue 
happiness by violating the rights of others may be condemned 
for acting badly (that is, contrary to the good); they may be 
forcibly coerced, however, only because they are acting un-
justly (that is, contrary to the just or right). 
That a natural rights approach restricts bad (as distinct from 
unjust) conduct comes as no surprise. However, a natural 
rights approach also restricts good conduct. Earlier I described 
the legal enterprise-with its rivalrous components of the rule 
possible, or without which an ordered society directed toward certain specific 
goals must fail of its mark. ... It does not condemn men for failing to embrace 
opponunities for the fullest realization of their powers. Instead, it condemns 
them for failing to respect the basic requirements of social living. 
L. FuLLER, supra note 2, at 5-6. 
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oflaw and natural rights based on both a moral rights and con-
sequentialist analysis-as. the means by which we solve the 
problem of social order. 59 But social order is not the only prob-
lem facing persons living in society with others. What about the 
provision of food, water, shelter, and other material, not to 
mention spiritual, needs of life? Does not the legal enterprise 
have an important role to play in the provision or at least the 
distribution of all these goods as well? 
A full answer to this question requires that one actually work 
out the natural rights approach. I have begun this project else-
where and have addressed this question there.60 Still, some ba-
sic methodological observations can be made here. First, one 
ought not use the mechanisms that enable social order to exist 
to address other pressing problems if doing so seriously under-
mines the ability of these mechanisms to continue to address 
the problem of social order. The attainment of social order is a 
prerequisite to effectively addressing the other problems of so-
cial life. A society in complete or near chaos cannot address any 
social problem effectively, however serious it may be. Else-
where I have analogized this point to stealing from a building's 
foundation to add more floors to the top. 61 A very well-
designed building can tolerate a bit of this type of activity with-
out collapsing, but a policy of taking from the foundation to 
build a higher building increases the risk of collapse from the 
very first taking and ensures that a catastrophe will occur at 
some point if it is continued. 
Second, if establishing and preserving social order actually 
prevented the effective pursuit of these other vital goals, we 
would seriously question the priority we place on social order. 
To the contrary, however, the achievement of social order 
based on the precepts of justice and the rule of .law makes it 
possible for other institutions to pursue other goals without vi-
olating the constraints imposed by these precepts of justice. In-
deed, a consequentialist analysis would reveal such institutions 
to be far more capable of addressing these problems than any 
known alternative. 
Finally, the natural rights method I have described with its 
59. See supra notes !18-56 and accompanying text. 
60. See Barnett, supra note 47, at 60-6!1. I am ~ently in the process of developing 
this approach in the context of an extensive explanation of the liberal conceptions of 
justice and the rule of law. 
61. Stt id. at 62. 
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consequentialist component allows the theoretical possibility 
that, in extreme and abnormal instances, exceptions can be 
made. I am skeptical that any exception to the regime of justice 
and the rule oflaw is necessary or prudent, but about this ques-
tion reasonable people in the liberal tradition have and will 
continue to differ. In my view this disagreement at the margin 
does not undermine the basic approach to rights and conse-
quences that I have sketched here. 
CONCLUSION: WHY COMPETING MODES OF ANALYSIS? 
The approach I have sketched here is multifaceted. It con-
sists of a process of dispute resolution that is governed by prin-
ciples of the rule of law. The particular outcomes of this 
evolving legal process are then subjected to rational scrutiny 
provided by a natural rights analysis that has both a moral 
rights and a consequentialist component. The results of this 
process of critical reason are then folded back into practice to 
see how they far~. Why is a multifaceted approach necessary? If 
the rule of law is sound, why do we not just accept the results it 
recommends? If a moral rights analysis is sound, why do we not 
just accept the results it recommends? If a consequentialist 
analysis is sound, why do we not just accept the results it 
recommends? 
Part of the answer has already been provided. The processes 
governed by the rule oflaw are needed to settle disputes before 
the results of an intellectual inquiry are in. This process gener-
ates a set of practices sophisticated enough to be subjected to 
rational scrutiny. Moral rights analysis permits us to discern, 
however abstra_ctly, the conditions that are needed for individu-
als and groups to pursue happiness in society with each other 
without wasteful and tragic experimentation. Consequentialist 
analysis is needed to test and refine the conclusions recom-
mended by a moral rights analysis. 
Another part of the answer concerns the twin problems of 
human error and deception that I referred to elsewhere as the 
problems of·knowledge and interest. 62 Because we know that 
the results of any mode of analysis can be mistaken, the more 
different modes of analysis that point in the same direction the 
62. See Barnett, supra note 38 (discussing the role that liberal conceptions of justice 
and the rule of law play in solving the social problems of knowledge, interest, and 
power). 
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more certain we can be that the results of our analysis are cor-
rect. Because we know that some people are willing to lie both 
to others and to themselves to aggrandize their interests at the 
expense of others, we need ways to discern deception when it 
occurs-particularly when argument~ are couched in familiar 
terms. Evil, as well as order, can be advocated on the grounds 
of tradition, morality, or expediency. It often takes a mul-
tifaceted analysis to show why such arguments are false, and, as 
we know, even a multifaceted analysis may not be enough. 
Finally, social order requires the use of force in defense of 
the moral rights embodied in law against those who would vio-
late these rights to serve their own interest. But permitting 
force to be used to address the problem of interest creates the 
problem of power. The problem of power is·a special instance 
of the problems ofknowledge and interest. For, once the use of 
power is permitted at all, we need to know when it is proper to 
use it. Using power raises the cost of erroneous judgment by 
imposing greater burdens on those who are mistakenly victim-
ized. And the instruments of power are powerful means to en-
hance the interests of those who wield it. For both these 
reasons we must place limits or constraints on the exercise of 
power--constraints that are, in part, provided by the multiple 
criteria of justice, with its components of moral rights and con-
sequences, and the rule of law. The other important constraint 
is the maintenance of competing institutions capable in ex-
tremes of using force against offending persons and 
institutions. 65 
In sum, the checks and balances approach to both concepts 
and institutions is the best way we know of to achieve and main-
tain social order in the face of the serious problems of knowl-
edge, interest, and power. An approach that purports to solve 
other pressing problems while ignoring these wiil be unsuc-
cessful in both theory and practice. 
THE IHS LAw AND PHILOSOPHY IssuE 
This is the fifth year that the Institute for Humane Studies at 
George Mason University and the Harvard journal of Law and 
Public Policy have collaborated on an issue devoted to law and 
-63. See Barnett, Pursuing]u.stice in a Free Society: Part Two-Crime Prevention and the Legal 
Order, CRtM.jUST. Ennes, Winter-Spring 1985, at 37-47 (discussing the need for and 
operation of a nonmonopolistic legal order). 
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philosophy. Volume Twelve marks a substantial change in our 
format. This issue commences with the article that received the 
1988 IHS Lon L. Fuller Prize in Jurisprudence: Jules L. Cole-
man, Douglas D. Heckathorn, and Stephen M. Maser's A Bar-
gaining Theory Approach to Default Provisions and Disclosure Rules in 
Contract Law. This is followed by a "Symposium on the Com-
patibility of Rights and Consequential Analysis." The contribu-
tors are Larry Alexander, Richard A. Epstein, Loren E. 
Lomasky, Eric Mack, Jeremy Waldron (last year's Fuller Prize 
recipient), and Christopher Wonnell. This marks the first time 
that an IHS Law and Philosophy Issue includes a symposium 
devoted to a particular topic. Appearing after the symposium 
are two excellent papers by recipients of IHS Leonard P. Cas-
sidy Summer Research Fellowships in Law and Philosophy: 
Roderick M. Hill's The Reconciliation of Law and Liberty in James 
Wilson, and Catherine Valcke's Locke on Property: A Philosophical 
Interpretation. 
Thanks are, of course, due to the authors who produced such 
excellent papers. Thanks are also due to Jackson R. Sharman 
III, the Editor-in-Chief of the Journal, and his editorial staff. 
They have been a joy to work with. I also wish to express my 
appreciation to Walter Grinder of the Institute for all his assist-
ance in planning this issue. Finally, I extend my deepest grati-
tude to the board of directors of the Verit~s Fund, Inc. for 
providing the funding for this annual IHS Law and Philosophy 
Issue, the IHS Lon L. Fuller Prize in Jurisprudence, and the 
IHS Leonard P. Cassidy Summer Research Fellowships in Law 
and Philosophy. 
Perhaps the collaboration between the several independent 
institutions that made this issue possible and the multifaceted 
creative processes that makes social order possible are analo-
gous. Without the very different contributions of these distinct 
but equal partners it is unlikely that we would be able to 
achieve our common end. 
